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Introduction
Kvasov (2007) introduces a non-constant-sum version of the classic Colonel Blotto game. Originating with Borel (1921) , the Colonel Blotto game examines strategic resource allocation across multiple simultaneous contests. Borel formulates this problem as a constant-sum game involving two players, A and B, who must each allocate a fixed amount of resources, X A = X B , over a finite number of contests. Each player must distribute their resources without knowing their opponent's distribution of resources. In each contest, the player who allocates the higher level of resources wins, and the payoff for the whole game is the sum of the wins across the individual contests. A novel feature of the Colonel Blotto game is that a mixed strategy is a multivariate distribution function in which each individual contest is represented as a dimension. The restriction on the players' expenditures implicitly places a constraint on the support of the players' joint distributions. Namely, each point contained in the support of a player's joint distribution must satisfy their budget constraint with probability one.
While a focal point in the early game theory literature, 1 the Colonel Blotto game has also experienced a recent resurgence of interest (see for example Golman and Page (2006) , Hart (2008) , Kovenock and Roberson (2007) , Laslier (2002) , Laslier and Picard (2002) , Roberson (2008) , or Weinstein (2005) ). Most closely related to this paper are Roberson (2006) and Kvasov (2007) . For all configurations of the asymmetric Colonel Blotto game with three or more contests, Roberson (2006) provides the characterization of the unique equilibrium payoffs. 2 The characterization of the equilibrium univariate marginal distributions and the existence of joint distributions which provide the equilibrium univariate marginal distributions and expend the players' respective budgets with probability one are also given in Roberson (2006) . In Borel's original formulation of the Colonel Blotto game the players' resources are "use it or lose it" in the sense that any resources which are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. Kvasov's (2007) non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game relaxes this use it or lose it feature. In the case of symmetric budgets, that paper
In this paper we extend the analysis of the non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game to allow for asymmetric budget constraints. As long as the level of asymmetry between the players' budgets is below a threshold, we find that there exists an affine transformation of the equilibrium to the constant-sum game which provides an equilibrium to the non-constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players' budgets exceeds the threshold this correspondence breaks down and we construct an entirely new equilibrium. For all configurations of the players' aggregate levels of force we characterize the unique equilibrium payoffs, and for most parameter configurations we characterize the complete set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium payoffs and the equilibrium set of univariate marginal distributions for the asymmetric non-constantsum version of the Colonel Blotto game. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
Two players, A and B, simultaneously enter bids in a finite number, n ≥ 3, of independent all-pay auctions. Each contest has a common value of v for each player. Each player has a fixed level of available resources (or budget), X i for i = A, B. Let X A ≤ X B , and define the modified budgets asX A = min{X A , nv/2} andX B = min{X B , nvX A /2}. 3 In the case that the players enter the same bid in a given contest, it is assumed that player B wins the auction if the common bid is X A , otherwise each player wins the auction with equal probability. The specification of the tie-breaking rule does not affect the results as long as (2/n)X B ≤X A . In the case that (2/n)X B >X A , this specification of the tie-breaking rule avoids the need to have player B provide a bid arbitrarily close to, but above, player A's maximal bid, X A . A range of tie-breaking rules yield similar results. 3 As shown in Appendix A,X i corresponds to the equilibrium expected expenditure for player i. This specification ofX i allows for a unified treatment of the three possible cases: (a) neither player using all of her available resources, (b) only the weaker player (A) using all of her available resources, and (c) both players A and B using all of their available resources. 4 Each contest is modeled as an all-pay auction. The payoff to player i for a bid of b j i in contest j is given by
where ties are handled as described above. Each player's payoff across all n all-pay auctions is the sum of the payoffs across the individual auctions.
The bid provided to each all-pay auction must be nonnegative. For player i, the set of feasible bids across the n all-pay auctions is denoted by
It will also be useful to define the set of n-tuples which exhaust the modified budgetsX A andX B . Let B i denote this set, defined as
Strategies
It is well known that there are no pure strategy equilibria for this class of games. A mixed strategy, which we term a distribution of resources, for player i is an n-variate distribution function P i : R n + → [0, 1] with support (denoted Supp(P i )) contained in the set of player i's set of feasible bids B i and with one-dimensional marginal distribution functions {F j i } n j=1 , one univariate marginal distribution function for each all-pay auction j. The n-tuple of player i's bids across the n all-pay auctions is a random n-tuple drawn from the n-variate distribution function P i .
The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto game
The N-C-S Colonel Blotto game, which we label
is the one-shot game in which players compete by simultaneously announcing distributions of resources subject to their budget constraints, each all-pay auction is won by the player that provides the higher bid in that auction (where in the case of a tie the 5 tie-breaking rule described above applies), and players' receive the sum of their payoffs across all of the all-pay auctions.
Note that in the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game two players simultaneously compete in a set of independent all-pay auctions subject to their respective budget constraints. The presence of the budget constraints gives rise to strategic considerations which are reminiscent of those arising in the single all-pay auction with budgetconstrained bidders (see Che and Gale (1998) ). However, in the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game the budget constraints hold not within one auction but across the entire set of auctions. As will be seen, the equilibria of these two games differ in fundamental ways.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is also instructive to compare this formulation with that of the constant-sum Colonel Blotto game. The constant-sum Colonel Blotto game differs from the non-constant-sum game in that in each contest j the payoff to each player i for a bid of b j i is given by
where ties are handled as described above. Note that, in the constant-sum game resources which are not allocated to one of the contests have no value; that is, resources are use it or lose it. Each player's payoff across all n contests is the sum of the wins across the contests to which the player provides a higher bid.
Optimal Distributions of Resources
The following four theorems examine the equilibrium distributions of resources for all symmetric and asymmetric configurations of resource levels. Theorems 1, 2 and 4 characterize the unique sets of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions and the unique equilibrium payoffs. Theorem 3 provides the unique equilibrium payoffs and a pair of equilibrium distributions of resources. 4 The first two theorems address the portion of the parameter space in which there exists an affine transformation (with respect to the modified budgets) of the equilibrium of the constant-sum game which constitutes an equilibrium of the non-constant-sum game. Once (X A /X B ) < (2/n) and X B > (n − 1)X A the correspondence between these 4 In this parameter range there exist a continuum of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions. 6 two games breaks down. Theorem 3 is based on the equilibrium of the constant-sum game. However, in this case the transformation entails a more involved modification to the support of the distribution. We conclude with Theorem 4 which constructs entirely new equilibrium distributions of resources in the remaining parameter range.
For the game NCB{X A , X B , n, v}, Theorem 1 examines all configurations of resource levels X A and X B which satisfy (2/n) < (X A /X B ) ≤ 1. are described as follows
Theorem 1 Let X A , X B , v, and n
The unique equilibrium expected payoff for player A is (nvX A /2X B )−X A , and the unique equilibrium expected payoff for player B is nv ( 
The existence of a pair of n-variate distribution functions which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 1 is provided in Roberson (2006) . In particular, Roberson (2006) establishes the existence of n-variate distribution functions for which Supp(P * i ) ⊂ B i and that provide the necessary sets of univariate marginal distribution functions given in Theorem 1. The proof of uniqueness of the univariate marginal distribution functions and equilibrium payoffs is given in Appendix A.
An important distinction between the constant-sum and the non-constant-sum versions of the game is that in the constant-sum version each player expends all of her resources with probability one as long as (1/n − 1) ≤ (X A /X B ) ≤ 1. This need not be the case in the non-constant-sum game. In particular there are three possible cases: (a) neither player uses all of her available resources, (b) only (the weaker) player A uses all of her available resources, and (c) both players A and B use all of their available resources.
While it is straightforward to show that any pair of n-variate distribution functions which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 1 form an equilibrium, it is useful to 7 provide the intuition for this result. We begin with the equilibrium expected payoffs for each player and any X A and X B contained in the portion of the parameter space for which Theorem 1 applies, and then examine these payoffs in each of the three possible cases. Let P * B denote a feasible n-variate distribution function for player B with the univariate marginal distributions {F j B } n j=1 given in Theroem 1. If player B is using P * B , then player A's expected payoff π A , when player A chooses any n-tuple of bids b A ∈ B A (one bid for each of the n all-pay auctions) such that b
The expected payoff π B to player B from any n-tuple of bids across the n all-pay
given in Theroem 1 -follows directly,
Observe that neither player can bid below 0 and that bidding above (2/n)X B is suboptimal. Thus, (1) and (2) provide the maximal payoffs (for player A and player B respectively) for any feasible n-tuple of bids across the n all-pay auctions. Suppose that we are in case (a) in which neither player uses all of her available resources. Case (a) corresponds to the situation in which the total value of the n auctions nv is low enough relative to the players' budgets that neither player has incentive to commit all of her resources. If player A does not use all of her budget, then from X A = min{X A , nv/2} it must be that X A > (nv/2) and soX A = (nv/2). Similarly from X B = min{X B , nvX A /2}, it follows that if player A (the weaker player) is not using all of her budget thenX B = (nv/2). Given thatX A =X B = (nv/2), the expected payoffs given in (1) and (2) are π A (b A , P * B ) = 0 and π B (b B , P * A ) = 0 respectively. Observe that in case (a) neither player has incentive to change the aggregate level of resources that they commit to the n all-pay auctions. That is, given that the opponent is using the equilibrium strategy, the expected payoff to each player is independent of the aggregate level of resources that they commit across the n all-pay auctions. 8 Now suppose that we are in case (b) in which only player A uses all of her budget. Case (b) corresponds to the situation in which the total value of the n all-pay auctions nv is high enough that the weaker player optimally commits all of her resources but not so high that the stronger player must also commit all of her resources to the n all-pay auctions. From the proceeding discussion it follows that X A ≤ (nv/2) and thusX A = X A . If player B is not using all of her budget then fromX B = min{X B , nvX A /2}, it must be that X B > nvX A /2 and soX B = nvX A /2. InsertingX A andX B into (1) and (2) and simplifying yields
and
Recall that in case (b) X A ≤ (nv/2) and so ( nv/2X A − 1) ≥ 0. From (3) we see that player A is indifferent with regards to which all-pay auctions to commit resources to, but has incentive to increase her aggregate level of resource commitment across the n all-pay auctions. However in case (b), player A is at her budget constraint and her equilibrium distribution of resources P * A expends her budget with probability one. 5 From (4) we see that the expected payoff to player B is independent of the aggregate level of resources that she commits across the n all-pay auctions (so long as she commits a strictly positive level of resources to each auction), and so player B does not have incentive to change the aggregate level of resources that she commits to the n all-pay auctions.
Finally, suppose that we are in case (c) in which both players use all of their budgets. Case (c) corresponds to the situation in which the total value of the n all-pay auctions nv is high enough that both players optimally commit all of their resources to the n all-pay auctions. Thus,X A = X A andX B = X B . From (1) and (2) it follows that
5 Recall that Roberson (2006) establishes the existence of n-variate distribution functions for which Supp(P * i ) ⊂ B i , and that in this caseX A = X A . It follows directly that player A expends her budget with probability one.
In case (c), X A < (nv/2) and X B < nvX A /2 < (nv/2). Observe in (5) that ((nv/2X B ) − 1) > 0 and, thus, player A has incentive to increase her aggregate level of resource commitment across the n all-pay auctions, but in her equilibrium distribution of resources P * A she is already at her budget constraint with probability one. Similarly, in (6) ((nvX A /2X 2 B ) −1) > 0 and, thus, player B has incentive to increase her aggregate level of resource commitment across the n all-pay auctions, but in her equilibrium distribution of resources P * B she is already at her budget constraint with probability one. Given that Roberson (2006) demonstrates the existence of a pair of n-variate distributions that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 1, it follows from the arguments given above that such a pair of n-variate distribution functions constitute an equilibrium in all three cases (a), (b), and (c). The proof of the uniqueness of the sets of univariate marginal distributions is given in Appendix A.
The following Theorem addresses the remaining portion of the parameter space for which there exists an affine transformation of the equilibrium of the constant-sum game which constitutes an equilibrium of the non-constant-sum game. 
Theorem 2 Let X A , X B , v, and n ≥ 3 satisfy (X
Similarly for player B
The unique equilibrium expected payoff for player A is nv((2/n)
− ((2X B )/(n 2 X A ))) − X A ,
and the unique equilibrium expected payoff for player B is nv(
The existence of a pair of n-variate distribution functions which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 2 is provided in Roberson (2006) . The proof of uniqueness of the univariate marginal distributions and equilibrium payoffs is given in Appendix A. 10 Before proceeding with a sketch of the proof that a pair of n-variate distributions that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 2 form an equilibrium, it is helpful to trace out the Theorem 2 parameter range. SinceX B = min{X B , nvX A /2} and (X A /X B ) < (2/n) it follows thatX
and soX A < (2v/n). Therefore it must be the case thatX A = X A . It also follows that X B ≤ (n − 1)X A combined with (n − 1)X A < nvX A /2 implies thatX B = X B . Thus, the Theorem 2 parameter range is given by 0 ≤ X A < (2v/n) and (n/2)X A < X B ≤ (n − 1)X A Returning to the sketch of the proof that a pair of n-variate distributions that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) 
Note that (2v/X 2 A )(X A − (X B /n)) − 1 ≥ 0 is equivalent to X B ≤ (n − (nX A /2v))X A . Since X A < (2v/n), it follows from (7) that player A has incentive to expend all of her available resources in the n all-pay auctions not only in expectation but with certainty.
Similarly, the expected payoff π B to player B from any n-tuple of bids across the n all-pay auctions b B ∈ B B such that b j B ∈ (0, X A ] for each auction j, when player A uses a feasible n-variate distribution P * A with the univariate marginal distributions {F
given in Theroem 2, is
Since X A < (2v/n) it follows that (2v/nX A ) − 1 > 0, and, thus, player B has incentive to expend all of her available resources in the n all-pay auctions with certainty. Given that Roberson (2006) demonstrates the existence of a pair of n-variate distributions that result in the sets of univariate marginal distributions given in Theorem 2 and that satisfy the budget restriction with probability 1, it follows from the arguments given above that such a pair of n-variate distribution functions constitute an equilibrium. The proof of uniqueness of the univariate marginal distributions is given in Appendix A.
While the first two theorems involve affine transformations (with respect to the modified budgets) of the equilibrium of the constant-sum game, once (X A /X B ) < (2/n) and X B > (n − 1)X A the correspondence between the constant-sum and non-constantsum games breaks down. For the remaining parameter range, Theorems 3 and 4 construct new equilibrium joint distributions. Theorem 3, which addresses the case that (X A /X B ) > (2/n) and min{nX A , (n − 2)X A + (2v/n)} > X B > (n − 1)X A , is also based on the equilibrium of the constant-sum game but includes a more involved modification of the support. Theorem 4, which addresses the remaining case that (X A /X B ) < (2/n) and X B ≥ min{nX A , (n − 2)X A + (2v/n)} (note that if X A < (2v/n) then min{nX A , (n − 2)X A + (2v/n)} > (n − 1)X A ), constructs entirely new equilibrium distributions of resources.
Before turning to the statements of Theorems 3 and 4, observe that while the relationship between the constant-sum and and non-constant-sum versions of the game is linear with respect to the modified budgets -as long as the level of asymmetry between the players' budgets is below the threshold given in Theorem 2 -the relationship between these games with respect to the aggregate resource levels is highly non-linear. Panel (i) of Figure 1 illustrates the regions of the parameter space corresponding to each of the four theorems in the non-constant-sum game, and Panel (ii) of Figure 1 illustrates the regions which correspond, for the constant-sum game, to Theorems 2, 3, and 5 of Roberson (2006) .
(ii) Constant-Sum Furthermore, in the region in which X A < (X B /n) the constant-sum game is trivial since resources are use it or lose it and the stronger player (B) has a sufficient level of resources to win each of the n contests with certainty. In this is region there is no relationship between the two games. Due to the relaxation of the use it or lose it feature, the non-constant-sum game never becomes trivial, and for the non-constant-sum game Theorem 4 constructs entirely new equilibrium distributions of resources in the remaining parameter range.
In the case that (X A /X B ) < (2/n) and min{nX A , (n − 2)X A + (2v/n)} > X B > (n − 1)X A Theorem 2 would provide the unique set of equilibrium marginal distributions if a sufficient n-variate distribution function were to exist for each player. As in the corresponding constant-sum parameter range, such a joint distribution fails to exist for player B. One equilibrium is given by an extension of the case of n = 2 with asymmetric forces discussed by Gross and Wagner (1950) . The set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions is not unique, but the equilibrium payoffs are unique.
Theorem 3 Define k
= ⌈(X A )/(X B − X A (n − 1))⌉. Let X A , X B , v, and n ≥ 3 satisfy (X A /X B ) < (2/n) and min{nX A , (n − 2)X A + (2v/n)} > X B > (n − 1)X A . A
Nash equilibrium of the game NCB{X A , X B , v, n} is for each player to allocate her resources according to the following n-variate distributions:
Player A randomly allocates 0 resources to n −2 of the all-pay auctions, each all-pay auction chosen with equal probability, (n − 2)/n. On the remaining 2 all-pay auctions player A utilizes a bivariate distribution function with k mass points, each mass point 13 receiving the same weight, (1 − (nX A )/(2v))/k. Player A's mass points on these two remaining all-pay auctions are located at the points
Player A uniformly distributes the remaining (nX A )/(2v) of the mass along her budget line {(
Player B randomly allocates X A forces to n −2 all-pay auctions, each all-pay auction chosen with equal probability, (n − 2)/n. On the remaining 2 all-pay auctions player B utilizes a bivariate distribution function with k mass points, each mass point receiving the same weight, (1 − n(X B − X A (n − 2))/(2v))/(k). Player B's mass points on the 2 remaining battlefields are located at
X A − i nX A − X B k − 1 , X A − (k − 1 − i) nX A − X B k − 1 , i = 0, . . ., k − 1.
Player B uniformly distributes the remaining (X B − X A (n − 2))/(2v) of the mass along her budget line
{(x 1 , x 2 )| x 1 + x 2 = X B − X A (n − 2
)} and the two line segments
{(x 1 , x 2 )| x 1 = X A and 0 ≤ x 2 ≤ X B − X A (n − 1)}, and {(x 1 , x 2 )| x 2 = X A and 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ X B − X A (n − 1)}.
The unique equilibrium expected payoff for player A is v(k
− 1) (2/n) − ((X B − (X A (n − 2))/v) /k,
and the unique equilibrium expected payoff for player B is (v
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix B.
The following Theorem constructs entirely new equilibrium distributions of resources for the portion of the parameter space in which the correspondence between the constantsum and non-constant-sum versions of the game breaks down. 
Theorem 4 Let X A , X B , v, and n ≥ 3 satisfy (X
14 Similarly for player B
The unique equilibrium expected payoff for player A is 0, and the unique equilibrium expected payoff for player B is nv(1 − (X A /v)).
The existence of n-variate distributions which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 4 is provided in Appendix C. The proof of uniqueness of the univariate marginal distributions and equilibrium payoffs is given in Appendix A. To see that these two sets of univariate marginal distributions form an equilibrium in the Theorem 4 parameter region, let P * B denote a feasible n-variate distribution for player B with the univariate marginal distributions {F j B } n j=1 given in Theorem 4. If player B is using P * B , then player A's expected payoff π A , when player A chooses any n-tuple of bids
From (9) given in Theroem 4, is
Thus, player B also has no incentive to increase or decrease her level of resource commitment in the n all-pay auctions.
Given that Appendix C provides the construction of n-variate distribution functions which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 4, it follows from the arguments given above that such a pair of n-variate distribution functions constitute an equilibrium. The proof of uniqueness of the univariate marginal distributions is given in Appendix A.
Conclusion
Kvasov (2007) introduces a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game which relaxes the "use it or lose it" feature of the traditional constant-sum formulation of the game. In the case of symmetric budgets, that paper establishes that a suitable affine 15 transformation of the constant-sum equilibrium is an equilibrium of the non-constantsum game. In this paper we characterize all asymmetric parameter configurations of the non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game. As long as the player's budgets are not too asymmetric, a suitable affine transformation (with respect to the modified budgets) of the constant-sum asymmetric equilibrium (Roberson 2006 ) is an equilibrium of the non-constant-sum asymmetric game. However, once the players' budgets are sufficiently asymmetric this correspondence breaks down. In this parameter range, we construct entirely new equilibrium joint distributions.
Appendix A
This appendix characterizes the sets of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions in Theorems 1, 2, and 4. Given that the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game is a set of independent and simultaneous all-pay auctions with (symmetric and asymmetric) budget constraints, the characterization of the equilibrium univariate marginal distributions follows along the line of argument for the characterization of the all-pay auction by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996). Roberson (2006) establishes the existence of feasible n-variate distribution functions for Theorems 1 and 2. The existence of such n-variate distribution functions for Theorem 4 is given in Appendix C.
In the discussion that follows we will focus on Theorem 1. The proofs for Theorems 2 and 4 follow directly. Lets Recall that in Theorem 1 the corresponding parameter space is (2/n) ≤ (X A /X B ) ≤ 1. It will also be convenient to note that, for a given P −i , with the set of univariate marginal distribution functions {F j −i } n j=1 , the Lagrangian of each player i's optimization problem 6 can be written as
where the set of univariate marginal distribution functions {F j i } n j=1 satisfy the constraint that there exists a mapping of the set of univariate marginal distributions into 16 a joint distribution (an n-copula), C, such that the support of the n-variate distribution Lemma 2 For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for each i ∈ {A, B},
The next two lemmas follow along the lines of the proofs in Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) . 
The following lemma characterizes the relationship between λ A and λ B . LetX i denote player i's expected expenditure, that is
Lemma 5 
The following lemma establishes the value ofs j . 7 While the characterization of the equilibrium univariate marginal distributions for the constant-sum and non-constant-sum versions of the game follow along similar lines, there are important distinctions. In both cases, Lemmas 1-4 are established using feasible points in the support. In the non-constant-sum game Kvasov (2007) uses a separating hyperplane argument to prove that each of the univariate marginal distributions is strictly increasing and continuous on its support. Conversely, in the constant-sum game Roberson (2006) relies on properties of two-player constant-sum games (namely, interchangeability of equilibrium strategies and uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs) to establish these properties of the univariate marginal distributions.
Lemma 6s
Proof From Lemma 2, we know that for each player i and any battlefield j,
x is constant ∀ x ∈ 0,s j . It then follows that player i would never use a strategy that provides offers in (
, ∞) since an offer of zero strictly dominates such a strategy. It follows from Lemma 4 that 
Solving for λ A we have that
It follows directly from Lemma 5 that
To complete the proof of Lemma 7, recall the three possible cases: (a) neither player uses all of her available resources, (b) only (the weaker) player A uses all of her available resources, and (c) both players A and B use all of their available resources.
In case (a) λ A = λ B = 0. From (13) and (14) (13) and (14) This completes the characterization of the sets of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions in Theorem 1. The proofs for Theorems 2 and 4 follow along similar lines.
Appendix B
The proof of Theorem 3, stated below, establishes the existence of an equilibrium in the game NCB{X A , X B , n} for X A , X B , and n ≥ 3 such thatX
The proof of uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs follows directly. In the discussion that follows, recall that k = X A X B −X A (n−1) , and thus, 2 ≤ k < ∞. First, the strategies in the statement of Theorem 5 are feasible since for player A
and for player B
Second, each player is indifferent between each point in the support of their strategy. For this equilibrium the univariate marginal distributions for player A and ∀ j ∈ {1, . . ., n} are
Similarly for player B and ∀ j ∈ {1, . . ., n} we have
We begin with player A's expected payoff for each of her k mass points, and then examine the remaining uniform randomization. Note that
Thus, given that player B is following the equilibrium strategy, player A's allocation of i X A k−1 to an all-pay auction yields the expected payoff
Lastly, we consider player A's expected payoff from the uniform randomization between the mass points. Given that player B is following the equilibrium strategy, the payoff to player A for any allocation in which no all-pay auction is allocated more than X B − X A (n − 1) is zero. Similarly, if, for any 0 < ε ≤ k−1 , and each mass point has the same weight, player A cannot achieve a higher expected payoff from dividing these remaining resources among more than one all-pay auction. Thus, given that player B is following the equilibrium strategy, the maximum expected payoff to player A for an arbitrary strat-
The argument for player B is symmetric. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
In the expression for this bivariate distribution function we will use the following notation.
The bivariate distribution function for x 1 , x 2 is given by . To see that F provides the necessary univariate marginal distributions, observe that given the randomization outlined above player A allocates zero resources to each all-pay auction j with probability Figure 2 , and this randomization is discussed in greater detail directly following this outline. 3. There are n C 2 ways of dividing the n all-pay auctions into disjoint subsets such that n − 2 all-pay auctions receive X A with probability 1 and 2 all-pay auctions involve randomizations of force as in point 2. The n-variate distribution function formed by placing probability [ n C 2 ] −1 on each of these n-variate distribution functions has univariate marginal distribution functions which each have a mass point of (1 − The bivariate distribution function for x 1 , x 2 is given by
Following from the arguments given above for player A, it follows that F provides the necessary univariate marginal distributions for all-pay auctions 1 and 2. If X A < v n and X B ≥ nX A , then player B allocates X A to n−1 of the all-pay auctions and provides a random level of resources in the one remaining all-pay auction. In this one remaining all-pay auction player A has a mass point of (1 − nX A v ) at X A and randomizes uniformly over the interval [0, X A ) with the remaining mass.
